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with remarkable maturity and consistency. Not
surprisingly, the debate analyzed here foreshadowed some of the arguments later used in Germany’s powerful antinuclear movement of the
1970s and 1980s. While the proponents of the
reactor cited economic opportunities, national
interests, and trust in scientific expertise as
strong arguments in favor of the project, the
protesters worried about radiation and its effects
on human health, water supply, and agriculture.
However, the protest failed to stabilize opposition to the project on a long-term basis and
quickly subsided after the reactor was built. Indeed, there was apparently no ideological or
ecological foundation of any substantial sort that
would have provided the stamina and endurance
one can observe within Germany’s environmental movement in the following decades. The
protesters were a politically diverse group in
terms of party affiliation, with an overall outlook that was rather conservative and parochial.
With that in mind, the question arises as to
what this study could have achieved if its findings had been systematically placed in a larger
temporal context. In the introduction the authors
point to the lack of scholarly interest in the
protests against civil nuclear reactors during the
1950s. As a conclusion they maintain that “the
early citizens’ protest movement remained an
episode quickly blocked from collective memory, not just by those affected” (p. 116; my
translation). With that in mind, the reader would
have liked to learn more about the differences
between these protests and the massive antinuclear movement of the 1970s, which would
change the entire German nation and its political
landscape for good. Notwithstanding some references here and there, this pivotal development
appears to stand as the elephant in the room. The
scope of the local protests around Karlsruhe in
the 1950s could have been much more precisely
defined if the authors had offered more comparative discussion of what this apparently was not:
an overarching attack on the legitimacy of technocratic rule, fueled by a sense of global crisis
and a profound distrust of the political order and
its elites as such. Although traces of such notions are occasionally observable among the
protagonists of this study, the call for a fundamental ecological turnaround is barely perceptible; thus the very aspect that would lead to the
founding of the Green Party in 1980 — coincidentally, in the city of Karlsruhe—was conspicuously missing. Ultimately the 1950s protests
seem to be little more than NIMBY activism,
albeit analyzed here with care and attention to
detail and a laudable intention of the authors to
differentiate the circumstances. More insight
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into continuities and discontinuities regarding
later developments might have been aimed for,
given that considerable scholarship has been and
is still being produced with regard to the sea
change of the 1970s.
In terms of diction and style, the focus on a
close reading of local sources makes Fortschrittsfeinde im Atomzeitalter? a cumbersome read, as
the narrative sometimes has difficulties in emancipating itself from the historical material. Finally, a note to the publisher: the outward appearance of the book (the typesetting, etc.)
leaves much to be desired.
MICHAEL SCHÜRING
Sheldon Krimsky; Jeremy Gruber (Editors). Genetic Explanations: Sense and Nonsense. xi ⫹ 368 pp., index. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2013. $45 (cloth).
In her essay in this volume, Susan Lindee, paraphrasing Theodosius Dobzhansky, states one of
the book’s two major themes: “Nothing makes
sense in biology except in the light of the marketplace” (p. 186). The other theme is the bankruptcy of theories of genetic determinism as
espoused in the 1960s–1990s. As one of the
most recent challenges to claims for a genetic
basis for everything from psychiatric disorders
to criminal violence, aggression, and thrill seeking, the various essays included here provide
evidence, much of it from molecular biology and
genomics, that increasing recognition of gene–
gene and gene– environment interactions undermines the likelihood of tracing any simple
causal path from genotype to phenotype. It is a
welcome summary of evidence from the era of
molecular genetics and genomics, though it will
likely infuriate those who still want to pursue
the search for genetic causation of human psychiatric and behavioral traits.
The book opens with a foreword by Richard
Lewontin that describes the seductive and often
misleading power of metaphors in science, particularly persistent genetic metaphors: DNA as a
“blueprint”; the genome as the “book of life”;
genes functioning as “machinery.” The introduction, by coeditor Sheldon Krimsky, introduces the reader to the array of issues—specific
traits and methodologies—treated in the following chapters.
The body of the book is divided into three
parts. Part 1, “New Understanding of Genetic
Science,” deals with more general problems associated with thinking of genes as independent
causal agents in the study of genetic transmission, embryogenesis, and evolution. Essays by
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Ruth Hubbard, Stuart Newman, Evelyn Fox
Keller, David Moore, and Steven Talbott make
the point that in order to function at the molecular level, segments of DNA require a whole
host of interactions— control elements, enzymes
for replication, transcription and translation,
other molecules and gene products, as well as
agents and conditions external to the organism.
Genes do not produce anything by themselves
but are embedded in a large environmental matrix that extends from the cell cytoplasm to the
ecosystem, a series of connections traditionally
ignored or downplayed by classical and molecular geneticists—and particularly genetic determinists.
Part 2 is devoted to “Medical Genetics,” particularly the failed program for disease prognosis and treatment based on genetic/genomic information; it offers essays by Eva Jablonka,
Carlos Sonnenschein and Ana Soto, Jay Joseph
and Carl Ratner, Carl Cranor, Martha Herbert,
and David Jones. A main theme of this section is
that despite three or more decades of wellfunded research, the prospects of medical therapeutics, especially in regard to psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, criminality, or
autism, and the more recent promises of racially
based or “personalized” medicine have not been
realized to any significant degree. The problem
lies, the various authors suggest, in an oversimplified view of causality in what Cranor calls a
“multicausal world.” The failure of all the various studies over the last twenty to thirty years
to be replicated or to have localized a single
gene or set of genes that can be unambiguously
said to be related to the conditions it was supposed to influence again underscores that one of
the main problems of this “genocentric” view of
the world is that it has led researchers away
from studying in more detail the environmental
factors that affect the development of the organism.
Part 3, “Genetics in Human Behavior and
Culture,” contains essays by Jonathan Beckwith,
Susan Lindee, Shirley Shalev, William C.
Thompson, and Mae-Wan Ho. It covers topics
such as the new industry of determining your
own genetic identity, the quest for breeding
“better babies,” the myth of “infallibility” in
using DNA evidence in forensics, and how environmental effects, especially in early animal
(including human) development, can influence
gene expression; these are effects that can under
certain conditions be passed on to the infant’s
own offspring. A summary essay by coeditor
Jeremy Gruber, entitled “The Unfulfilled Promise of Genomics,” concludes the volume.

In such a collection, it is inevitable that the
breadth and depth of the articles vary. I can
highlight only a few. Beckwith’s survey of
failed theories of genetic determinism (Ch. 12)
presents a particularly useful historical survey of
the problems surrounding cases such as the purported relationship of the XYY chromosome
complement to crime (1960s), putative genetic
differences between males and females in mathematical ability (1980s), the relationship of
monoamine oxidase deficiencies and violent behavior (1990s), and, finally, claims for a genetic
basis for brain evolution (2005). Beckwith,
along with other writers in the volume, such as
Lindee, speaks to the sensational way the news
media has reported claims for such causal effects of genes over the years, along with a deficiency in public science literacy, as one means
by which a genocentric view of the world has
persisted. Lindee hits it more directly when she
notes that much of modern genomics—medicine
as well as home genetic identity kits and the
like—is driven by market forces, based on exaggerated claims.
Another particularly useful essay is Joseph
and Ratner’s “The Fruitless Search for Genes in
Psychiatry and Psychology,” which dissects the
basic methodologies on which such studies have
traditionally been based—twins (monozygotic
and dizygotic) raised apart and adoptions—
showing how inadequate they are to separate the
supposed effects of genetics and environment.
Behind all these investigations is the dilemma
Evelyn Fox Keller points to in her essay, “Genes
as Difference Makers”—namely, that traditional
genetic studies have relied on looking at differences in a trait based on a variant (mutant) form
and inferring from this difference the way the
wild-type trait is formed. This approach, one of
the central methodologies of genetics from the
beginning, tells more about what a variant
doesn’t do than what the nonvariant actually
does. An associated issue is that this approach
has traditionally bypassed the process of embryonic development completely.
Overall, Genetic Explanations: Sense and
Nonsense is useful in bringing the problems of
older, persistently deterministic views of genetics into the modern era of genomics, indicating
how the much greater complexity of components and processes that have been revealed in
recent years (modular organization of the genome, alternative splicing, genetic control elements) has pulled the rug out from under any
simplistic notion of genetic causality. It is instructive to note that even in cases where clear
genetic relationships are known for human diseases, such as phenylketonuria or cystic fibrosis,
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predictions of degrees of severity and paths to
possible therapies have proven largely irrelevant
or inadequate. This book summarizes clearly the
deficiencies in the traditional claims for genetic
determinism. On the other hand, it would have
been interesting to have included at least one
essay from one of the more committed determinists to see how they have reacted to the
modern evidence that undermines their claims.
GARLAND E. ALLEN
Stefan Sperling. Reasons of Conscience: The
Bioethics Debate in Germany. 333 pp., bibl.,
index. Chicago/London: University of Chicago
Press, 2013. $32.50 (paper).
This book, written by a trained ethnologist, explores the most recent bioethics debates by tackling lively discussions between bioethics experts, life scientists, politicians, and laypeople.
The main subjects are modern stem-cell research and experimentation with embryos in the
unified Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as
well as the reworking (Aufarbeitung) of science
and medicine under the Communist regime in
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This
multitude of (bio-)ethical subjects already suggests the vast scope (in only 289 pages) and
major problem of the book: the preselected character of the issues at stake and their quite unrelated nature.
Between 2001 and 2003, Stefan Sperling interned as a U.S.-based researcher in the headquarters of the parliamentary Enquete Kommission on Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine
(EK), where he conducted “ethnographic” studies on the experts and administrators of this
prominent ethics board in order to analyze the
intricate relations between scientific research,
political decision making, and the impact of
historical memory in recently unified Germany
(pp. 15–18). As regards its methodology, the
book builds on “several months of participantobservation fieldwork with the parliamentary
ethics commission. . . . It was as if, despite all
their efforts to make the commission’s workings
transparent to me, I kept running into unwritten
rules like invisible glass walls” (p. 62). Much of
the author’s confusion might nevertheless originate from the fact that the “ethnomethodology”
of the research project is barely made explicit in
this volume. The best definition, which readers
are provided with under the rubric of “Ethnography of Transparency” (p. 112 ff), emphasizes
that “as an anthropologist of public morality, I
am interested in how people use transparency in
specific cultural contexts,” while relating this
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perspective to the book’s narrative that “Germans almost seem to hold lack of transparency
accountable for the circumstances that permitted
the Nazis to take control of the German parliament” (p. 112) in 1933. The author repeats this
main assumption further without clearly analyzing how the assumed lack of transparency became a central, if not the key, factor in the
political developments of the 1930s. With regard to the historical perspectives provided, the
book remains rather superficial–––and only
glancingly references the historical and political
literature on the subject (providing 5 pages of
bibliographic references; pp. 311–315)–––while
also falling short of more elaborate answers as
to how the political and cultural context of the
Weimar Republic and the Nazi period influenced modern bioethics discourse in Germany.
On the positive side, Reasons of Conscience
provides North American and international
readers with sufficient information about three
major ethics debates as they unfolded in the
actual setting of policy making in the vicinity of
the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag).
All of this is related through the unique–––
though equally idiosyncratic–––perspective of a
U.S. researcher marginally embedded in one of
the federal ethics committees, one that was dissolved in 2008 when a new central advisory
council, the German Ethics Council (Deutscher
Ethikrat), was formed. On the one hand, the
book’s thematic attempt is quite valuable, while
on the other it raises more questions than it
answers: How did Germany’s past really influence new ways of pursuing transparency in political decision making? In what ways were the
debates a reflection of philosophical trends (despite frequent allusions to Immanuel Kant [p.
154], Jürgen Habermas [p. 102], and Odo Marquard [p. 103], this remains largely unexplored
in the book)? How does the German case compare to other international developments (e.g.,
the stem-cell debate in the United States) or,
with regard to the topic of science and medicine
in the GDR, to the situation in other postCommunist countries? The author is certainly in
a unique position, regarding his training in
North America, his family and professional
backgrounds in Germany, and his use of interdisciplinary scholarship, to answer such questions in fruitful ways; yet Reasons of Conscience itself only scratches the surface of “the
cultural context” of the bioethics debate in Germany (p. 141). Given that this review is provided for the readership of Isis, I should note
that historians of science, technology, and medicine might find Sperling’s personal accounts of
the “ethnography” of EK’s and NER’s (the Ger-
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